Security regulators and the business press have alleged that firms play an "earnings-guidance game" where analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. In a comprehensive sample of I/B/E/S individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings from 1983-1998, we find strong support for the claim in the post-1992 period. We examine whether the 'walk down' to beatable targets is associated with managers' incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (insider trades). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the 'walk down' to beatable targets is most pronounced in firms that are either net issuers of equity or in firms where managers are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on how capital market incentives affect communications between managers and analysts.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate allegations by security regulators and the business press that firms and analysts are involved in an "earnings-guidance game." Critics have claimed that analysts make optimistic forecasts (above actual earnings) at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. We develop and test hypotheses on this pattern of analyst optimism and pessimism based on firm and managerial trading incentives to avoid a "disappointment" on the official announcement of firm earnings.
The motivation for our investigation is straightforward. The recent business press is replete with articles alleging that firms deliberately attempt to deceive or pressure analysts into making 'beatable' or pessimistic forecasts (below actual earnings). Even as far back as 5/6/91, Laurie P. Cohen, staff reporter of the Wall Street Journal wrote in the article "Low-Balling: How Some Companies Send Stocks Aloft" that: However, the claim that firms systematically beat analysts' targets runs counter to prior academic research on analysts' forecasts. Almost all past empirical studies have found systematic analyst optimism relative to actual earnings outcomes (see, for example, O 'Brien, 1988 and Abarbanell, 1991) . It is only recently that researchers have documented systematic analyst forecast pessimism relative to actual quarterly earnings (see Brown, 2001 and Matsumoto, 1999) .
We delve further into this issue by examining how capital market incentives can lead to an "earnings guidance game" where managers walk down analysts' forecasts to beatable targets.
We begin our analysis by developing a framework for the "earnings guidance game."
The framework is based on three underlying regularities. First, managers care about their firms' short-term stock price level if they are about to sell shares on their personal account or on behalf of the firm after an earnings announcement. We focus on post-earnings announcement equity transactions because the majority of these transactions are restricted to the period after official earnings releases. Second, managers can influence analysts' earnings estimates and targets through discretionary information disclosures. Finally, the market appears to reward firms that beat analysts' latest earnings target, regardless of the path to that target. These three elements have been separately discussed and documented in prior studies. We take the next step by combining the three elements and arguing that, together, they provide managers with strong incentives to guide analysts' forecasts to beatable targets prior to an earnings announcement. In other words, managers wishing to sell stock on favorable terms after an earnings announcement are motivated to deflate analysts' earnings targets before an earnings announcement.
Our framework has two major empirical predictions. First, structural changes in stockbased executive compensation and changes in insider trading rules have increased managers' incentives to achieve beatable analyst targets during the 1990's. Therefore, we predict a systematic shift toward analyst pessimism prior to earnings announcements during the 1990's.
Second, we predict that cross-sectional variation in analyst pessimism will vary with firm and managers' demand to sell shares after an earnings announcement.
We test these predictions using a large sample of analyst forecasts over the past two decades. We first examine the pattern of analysts' forecasts from 1983 to 1998 in each of the 12-months in the forecast horizon leading up to an annual earnings announcement. In the period 1983-1991, we find that analysts' forecasts are sys tematically optimistic relative to actual earnings in both the long and short horizons prior to an earnings announcement. However, we find that there is a structural change in the 1992-1998 period. In this latter period, analysts' exhibit systematic optimism at the start of the year, but then switch to systematic pessimism in the final months prior to an earnings announcement. The greater short-horizon pessimism observed in 1990s relative to the 1980s is consistent with our time-series prediction. These findings are robust for a fixed sample of firms that existed for the full 1983-1998 sample period, indicating that the post-1992 switch to pessimism is not due to changes in sample composition.
Consistent with our cross-sectional predictions, we find that forecast pessimism prior to an earnings announcement is more common for firms that are about to issue new equity and whose insiders are net sellers of the firm's stock in the period immediately following an earnings announcement. In addition, firms with net insider selling are more likely to experience a switch from optimism early in the forecast horizon to pessimism closest to the earnings announcement.
Taken as a whole, the evidence is consistent with the allegation that managers systematically guide analysts toward beatable targets to sell equity on favorable terms after an official earnings announcement.
Our findings complement the results of Aboody and Kasznik (2000) who present evidence consistent with managers strategically disclosing information in order to obtain stock options on favorable terms. Our approach examines managerial incentives to strategically disclosing information in order to sell stock on favorable terms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop hypotheses concerning the time-series and cross-sectional determinants of analysts' forecast bias. Section 3 presents evidence on our time-series predictions using analyst forecast data for the 1980's and 1990's. In Section 4, we test the cross-sectional predictions of forecast bias arising from the earnings expectations game between analysts and management. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background and hypothesis development
In this section, we present a framework to motivate the apparent earnings-guidance game between managers and analysts. This framework identifies (i) when managers would care about short-term stock price, (ii) how managers can influence analysts' earnings targets, and (iii) how firms and managers benefit from beating analysts' earnings targets. We combine these elements to develop hypotheses on the time-series and cross-sectional variation in analysts' optimism and pessimism. We first discuss the institutional features that motivate managers to care about the stock price specifically around the earnings announcement date. These institutional features concern the timing of insider transactions in a firm's stock and the timing of new equity sales by the firm.
Next, we discuss how analysts' forecasts influence stock prices, offer explanations as to why analysts cooperate with the managers in setting forecasts, and discuss recent empirical research indicating that managers are indeed able to influence analysts' forecasts. Finally, we discuss recent empirical results indicating that investors fixate on meeting thresholds such as analysts' forecasts, and reward good versus bad news asymmetrically. We argue that if the market rewards firms that beat analysts' latest earnings target and if managers wish to sell equity on favorable terms after an earnings announcement then managers have strong incentives to influence analysts' expectations to avoid an earnings disappointment.
These three elements suggest testable hypotheses about managers' capital market incentives to walk down analysts' earnings forecasts to beatable levels. The first prediction links economy-wide changes in analyst forecast bias to structural changes in managerial compensation and changes in the institutional rules governing insider trading during the 1990's. The second prediction links the cross-sectional variation in analyst forecast bias to cross-sectional variations in insider trading and new equity issuance activities.
Why and when managers care about short-term stock price
Managers intending to issue new equity on the firm' s behalf clearly care about the firm's stock price level because it directly affects the proceeds from the equity sale. This effect is most pronounced around earnings announcements because new equity issues typically occur in the weeks following a public earnings announcement (Korajczyk, Lucas, and MacDonald, 1990 Lemmon, 1998 and Jeng, 1999) . Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon report that these 2 Managers also care about the stock price performance because poor stock price performance encourages a hostile takeover and subsequent firing by the acquiror's board of directors. An active external labor market also rewards a manager with a reputation for maintaining good stock price performance. Additionally, a manager is in a better position to bargain for higher future compensation if the stock price performance is good. 
Managers' ability to manage analyst forecasts
Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest that managers can indeed influence analysts' earnings forecasts. First, as a key provider of information to analysts, managers can affect analysts' earnings expectations by controlling the content and timing of discretionary information releases. Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther (2000) find that firms use pre-announcements of earnings to manage analysts' expectations. They also find that managers are selective in the content of their disclosures and appear to receive stock price benefit from managing analysts toward beatable targets.
Second, it has been argued that managers can pressure analysts to adjust their forecasts away from their true beliefs because of analysts' dependence on management for future information (see Francis and Philbrick (1993), and Lim (2001) Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) argue that career concerns motivate analysts to make more accurate forecasts, it should be recognized that firm profit incentives from trading venture investments and underwriting deals may affect career concerns and influence analysts to bias forecasts in the direction favored by client firms and managers.
Managers' incentives to achieve beatable targets
Almost all past empirical studies on earnings forecasts have found systematic analyst optimism (see, for example, O 'Brien, 1988) . While past studies have documented increases in the accuracy of analyst forecasts as the earnings announcement approaches, this research found to the period immediately after earnings announcements also reduces the adverse selection problem by minimizing continued analyst optimism at all forecast horizons (see, for example, Brown, Foster and Noreen, 1985) . It is only recently that researchers have provided some evidence of analyst pessimism in quarterly earnings forecasts (see Brown, 2001 and Matsumoto, 1999) . These studies argue that management communications with analysts lead to these deflated earnings expectations.
Systematic analyst optimism implies that firms are more likely to miss rather than beat analysts' targets. This can have detrimental effects for a firm if investors' perception of the firm is influenced by whether it meets certain earnings thresholds. For example, Skinner and Sloan (1999) find an asymmetry in investor reaction to beating versus missing a threshold. In particular, they find a greater stock price drop when firms fall short of forecasts than the stock price rise when firms beat forecasts by an equivalent magnitude of earnings surprise. They also find that this asymmetry is especially pronounced for high growth firms. These results are obtained relative to a threshold cons isting of analyst forecasts made in the last month prior to the earnings announcement. Thus, the threshold that drives these effects is set by very short-horizon forecasts.
The discontinuity in investor reaction to missing versus meeting or beating analysts' forecasts creates incentives for managers to guide analysts to beatable earnings forecasts prior to an earnings announcement. A slightly lower forecast can cause the firm to barely beat the forecast instead of missing it, which significantly increases the firm's expected post-earningsannouncement stock price. As reported by Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2000), the incremental market valuation associated with earnings surprises is independent of the path taken to achieve the earnings target. In other words, the only consensus forecast that seems salient for the stock the asymmetry of information between uniformed outsiders and the inside managers.
price reaction to the earnings announcement appears to be the one closest to the earnings announcement.
As discussed earlier, prior research has shown that analyst forecasts tend to be optimistic throughout the forecast horizon, but management has incentives to achieve beatable forecasts prior to an earnings announcement. Therefore, we predict a switch from analyst optimism to pessimism when managers and firms have strong incentives to maximize stock prices immediately after the earnings announcement. Below we discuss two structural changes between 1980s and 1990s that support the claim that these incentives have become stronger in the 1990s.
Hypothesis on time-series changes in analyst pessimism
Two structural The greater predominance of exercisable stock options in the 1990s suggests greater managerial attention to stock prices. The fact that a greater number of executives now wish to sell stock in the trading periods after earnings announcements leads to greater incentives for these managers to guide analysts to avoid an earnings disappointment that would negatively affect share prices after the earnings announcement.
The second structural change occurred in May 1991 when securities regulators changed the "short-swing" rule affecting insiders' stock option exercises. Prior to 1991, Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act requires insiders to hold shares of stocks acquired through an option exercise for at least six months before selling, or the profits will go to the firm. In May 1991, the S.E.C. effectively removed this restriction by changing the starting date of the six-month holding period from the exercise date to the option grant date. Consequently, after May 1991, managers
have a more precise target date for when to exercise their stock options and immediately unload their shares, which increases their ability to affect the earnings surprise for when they trade. As discussed earlier, the firm-initiated blackout rules confining permitted insider trades to the period immediately following earnings announcements further sharpens managerial focus on the stock price during the earnings announcement period. Note that these blackout rules became more pronounced during the 1990s.
Given these structural changes in the early 1990's, we hypothesize a systematic change in managers' incentives and ability to guide analysts' earnings targets. Based on these major changes in how managers are compensated and when they can trade, we hypothesize a shift to greater analyst pessimism prior to earning announcements during the 1990's compared to the 1980's. This leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Structural changes in managerial incentives to achieve beatable forecasts leads to
short-horizon pessimistic analyst forecasts prior to earnings announcements in the 1990's.
Hypotheses on cross-sectional determinants of analyst pessimism
As we previously described, there are three empirical facts that are related to the expectations management game: (i) managers care about short term share prices if they are about to sell shares on their personal account or on behalf of the firm after an earnings announcement,
(ii) managers can influence analysts' expectations through their information disclosures, and (iii) the market appears to reward firms that beat analysts' latest earnings targets. Therefore, managerial incentives to guide analysts' forecasts are strongest if the firm and/or its managers are about to sell stock. This leads to the following cross-sectional prediction:
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of observing short-horizon pessimistic analyst forecasts prior to an earnings announcement is increasing in management and firm demand to sell stock after an earnings announcement.
Finding evidence in support of this hypothesis is consistent with analysts being guided toward a pessimistic target. However, an observed correlation between post-earnings announcement equity sales and short-horizon pessimism may also be interpreted as stakeholders selling shares after truly unexpected good news. If managers are truly guiding analysts toward beatable targets, then a more compelling sequence of events would be as follows: (i) analysts initially issue optimistic (or unbiased) earnings forecasts, (ii) analysts then revise their forecasts to become pessimistic before an earnings announcement, (iii) the firm or its insiders sell stock after the firm beats the revised earnings target. In other words, we should observe an "opportunistic" switch from optimistic (or unbiased) to pessimistic analyst forecasts prior to firm or insider equity sales. This leads to our second cross-sectional prediction on cross-sectional determinants of expectations management:
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of observing a switch from optimistic to pessimistic analyst forecasts prior to an earnings announcement is increasing in management and firm demand to sell stock after an earnings announcement.
Pattern of analyst bias over the forecast horizon
In this section, we investigate claims that analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level that the firm can beat by the end of the year. We compare the dynamic pattern of analyst bias over the forecast horizon during the 1980's and 1990's to test our time-series prediction outlined in Hypothesis 1.
Sample and variable construction
Data on individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings per share are obtained from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detail History U.S. Edition tapes from 1983 to
1998. Unlike many previous studies, we use individual analysts' forecasts to calculate consensus forecasts to avoid potential staleness of the I/B/E/S consensus forecasts (see, for example, Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992) .
The data sample consists of all individual analyst forecasts of annual earnings for firms with data availability on both I/B/E/S and Compustat. 4 We consider forecasts of annual earnings made within twelve months of the annual earnings release date reported by I/B/E/S (Actuals File). To track forecast revisions leading up to the annual earnings announcement, we sort analysts' forecasts into twelve groups by 30-day blocks. Forecasts made less than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement are grouped in Month-1, forecasts between 30-and 60-day lags in
Month-2, and so on up to Month-12. We then calculate a monthly consensus forecast for each firm using the median of individual-analyst forecasts in that month.
The forecast error is defined as the actual earnings per share minus the median forecast of earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. The stock price deflator is used to control for potential spurious relations resulting from cross-sectional scale differences in earnings per share 5 . A negative error implies an optimistic forecast whereas a positive error implies a pessimistic forecast. Formally, the forecast error, FE, for firm i in calendar year y and forecast horizon month-t is calculated as:
FE(i,y,t) = [Earnings Per Share (i,y) -Forecast (i,y,t)] / P(i,y*) (1)
Firms' actual earnings per share are obtained from I/B/E/S for comparability with the forecast. 6 The deflator P(i,y*) is the first available stock price for firm i in year y reported in the 4 The empirical findings documented in this section also exist for a broader sample of firms not restricted by Compustat data availability. 5 We also replicate the analysis using total assets per share as a deflator (see Figure 2b ). The general results remain unchanged using this alternate deflator. 6 According to I/B/E/S, analyst earnings forecasts usually exclude extraordinary items and discontinued operations.
The I/B/E/S actual earnings number also excludes these items and, as a result, may not correspond to a firm's bottom-line income number. 1983-85, 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94 , and the final sub-period 1995-98 covers four years. Table 1 shows that the number of available observations has increased monotonically with calendar time by about three-fold between the earliest sub-period 1983-85 to the latest subperiod 1995-98. This large increase reflects the expanded coverage of the I/B/E/S database and the proliferation of analysts over time. This is likely driven by increased interest from individual investors in equities and the growth in the number of public companies in the last 16 years.
Sub-period analysis
We present three measures of forecast bias for each of twelve months prior to the earnings announcement in months prior to an earnings announcement. In each month, a firm is assigned a code depending on the median analyst forecast --the code is equal to 1 if the median forecast is pessimistic, zero if it is unbiased, and -1 if it is optimistic. We then aggregate the codes across firms in each month and an index is calculated as the average value over all firm codes in each month. This index captures the relative proportion of pessimistic forecasts to optimistic forecasts in a given month. 9 We use this categorical index because it is often argued that what really matters is whether the firm beats the consensus earnings target, not by how much the firm beats the target.
For the overall sample, the %RelPess index has a value of -0.19 in the twelfth month prior to the earnings announcement. In other words, the majority of analyst forecasts are optimistic early in the year. However, by Month-3 analysts are equa lly likely to be pessimistic or optimistic. In the month prior to the earnings announcement, the %RelPess index has a value of 0.11 indicating that analysts are net pessimistic in the overall sample. switch to systematic pessimism that is coincident with structural changes in the use of executive stock option compensation, focused insider trades in the post-earnings announcement period and the lifting of the "short-swing rule" for insiders during the 1990's.
Regression analysis of forecast pessimism
Potential confounding effects for our univariate results are changes in firm attributes between the 1980's and 1990's that may have driven the pessimism results presented in Table 2 .
Therefore, we undertake a multiple regression analysis to control for other determinants of systematic bias in analysts' forecasts. For example, managers of high growth firms that require capital would also care about investor perceptions and want to avo id an earnings disappointment.
Therefore, we include a growth proxy as an additional determinant of forecast pessimism. We also consider firm profitability and size as additional determinants of forecast bias. Past studies have reported that large firms have less optimistic forecasts, and the forecast bias is also related to whether firms make profits or losses; see Brown (1998 Brown ( , 2001 and Burgstahler and Eames (1999) . It is not surprising that analysts ex post turn out to be optimistic for firms reporting losses and to be pessimistic for firms reporting profits.
Our regression tests are based on firm-month observations of forecast errors. This sample is created by calculating the monthly median of individual-analyst forecast errors from the original sample presented in Table 1 . The data set is a pooled time-series cross-sectional sample of 213,692 firm-month observations for the full sample period 1983-98. In Table 3 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, and 1995-98, respectively , and equal to 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book quintile ranking for firm i based on the market and book values of equity at the end of the previous year. MV is the annual market value of equity quintile ranking for firm i based on the market value of equity at the end of the previous year. MV and MB rankings are performed each year. Profit is an indicator variable taking on value one if the firm reports a profit and 0 otherwise. This ex post variable is used to control for truly unexpected economic performance of the firm that is unrelated to expectations management of analysts' forecasts.
Month ∈ {-12,-11,..,-2,-1} is a categorical variable for the month lag between the forecast and earnings announcement as described earlier in Section 3.
We find that even after controlling for time-period effects, profitability, and growth opportunities, the degree of optimism still decreases over the twelve months preceding the earnings announcement. As expected, the control variables for profitable firms, large market capitalization firms, and high-growth firms are significant and positively correlated with increased pessimism in analyst forecasts. More importantly, the predicted time-series pattern in analyst pessimism and optimism across sub-periods is robust to the inclusion of other determinants of analyst pessimism. In other words, one observes greater systematic analyst pessimism in (i) the months closest to an earnings announcement and (ii) in the latter sub-periods of the overall sample.
We supplement the prior analysis with regression tests that use actual forecast errors as the dependent variable. The regression model is: where FE is the price-scaled median forecast error as defined in Section 2, and the other variables are the same as regression model (2).
The results in Table 4 confirm our previous results on time variation in the forecast error bias. The three earliest sub-periods exhibit analyst optimism whereas the final two sub-periods exhibit a shift toward less optimistic analyst forecasts 10 . The results also indicate that forecasts are more pessimistic for profit firms and high market capitalization and market-to-book firms.
Robustness checks
Our forecast errors are price-deflated to allow direct comparison across firms, which i s standard in the literature. However, scaling by price may introduce inter-temporal variation in the median and mean forecast bias if price-earnings ratios have changed over time. Therefore, we replicate the analysis using an alternate deflator as total assets per share, and graph the results in Figure 2B . The general pattern of increasing forecast pessimism as the horizon shrinks is robust to the choice of deflation. As before, in the two latest sub-periods 1992-1994 and 1995-1998, there is a switch in forecast errors from optimism to pessimism as the earnings announcement approaches. It should also be emphasized that switchover results from optimism to pessimism (the sign change captured by our %RelPess meaure) cannot be explained by intertemporal variation in price-earnings ratios.
The time series results could also be affected by changing sample composition between 1983 and 1998. For example, a change in the composition of publicly traded companies or in the breadth of coverage on I/B/E/S may have affected the forecast bias over time. To rule out these alternative explanations, we replicate our tests using a fixed sample of firms that existed from 1986 to 1998. 11 Again, analyst forecasts are optimistic at all horizons for pre-1992 sub-sample.
However, there is a switch to pessimism in the last month prior to an earnings announcement in recent years for the fixed sample of firms that existed from 1986 to 1998. Therefore, our primary results are confirmed using this fixed sample of firms.
Our main time-series results track analyst forecast bias over the annual horizon. Our trading incentive framework predicts that the shift to pessimism would also occur in quarterly earnings forecasts. Therefore, we examine the dynamic pattern in analysts' forecasts of quarterly earnings per share. For brevity, we report the median and mean forecast errors only for the 1995-98 period in Figure 3 . 12 Figure 3 plots the mean and median quarterly forecast error (scaled by price) for a series of two-week windows preceding each f irm's quarterly earnings announcement. Similar to the results for the annual window, we document a pattern of increasing pessimism as the quarterly earnings announcement approaches. The forecast errors are either close to zero or optimistic initially, and then become pessimistic in the two weeks preceding a quarterly earnings announcement. Our finding of pessimism in the shortest horizon is consistent with findings reported by Bagnoli, Beneish, and Watts (1999), Brown (2001) , and 11 We also confirm our findings of a switch to pessimism using the I/B/E/S median consensus forecasts from the Summary Tapes between 1983-1998. 12 A summary of this analysis is available from the authors upon request. Matsumoto (1999) for forecasts of quarterly earnings at a given point in time relative to the announcement date in recent periods.
In sum, we find evidence of a robust shift towards greater forecast pessimism. The timing of this shift to pessimism prior to earnings announcements is coincident with the increased use of stock-based compensation in the 1990s and regulatory changes in 1991 concerning the "shortswing rule" affecting insider's stock option exercises. These changes clearly provide increased managerial incentives to guide analysts to forecast at a level the firm can beat at the earnings announcement date.
Our finding of optimism in earlier periods and pessimism in more recent periods provides a link between past studies finding forecast optimism and the recent allegations about forecast pessimism. The optimism found in past studies was obtained from data prior to 1992, whereas allegations of pessimism are made more recently. The small magnitude of pessimism we document here is also consistent with press allegations that f irms attempt to just beat the forecasts.
Cross-sectional variation in forecast bias
In this section we present empirical tests of our cross-sectional predictions contained in Hypotheses 2 and 3. These tests examine the impact of firm and insider trading incentives on the observed walkdown to beatable earnings targets.
New equity issuance data
We test the prediction that firms issuing new equity are more likely to beat forecasts at the earnings announcement just prior to issuance. Since a firm that is high growth would likely need new capital, and would also care about investor perceptions and want to avoid an earnings disappointment, we include a growth proxy as an additional determinant of forecast pessimism. Tables 3 and 4 , we also consider firm profitability and size as additional determinants of forecast bias.
Similar to our regression results in
To measure the firm's own trading activity, we consider two dummy variables: IssueNow captures equity issuance in the year of the forecast and IssueNext captures equity issuance in the following year. IssueNow equals one if the firm's statement of cash flows indicates a positive sale of common and preferred stock (COMPUSTAT item #108) greater than 5% of the market value of equity for that year, and is zero otherwise. IssueNext equals one if the firm's statement of cash flows indicates a positive sale of common and preferred stock (item #108) greater than 5% of the market value of equity in the next year and is zero otherwise. 13 We include IssueNow in addition to IssueNext because a firm would likely experience similar pressures to avoid an earnings disappointment immediately after issuance. The issuing firm would like to avoid lawsuits from disgruntled investors unhappy with a sizeable stock price drop from an earnings disappointment, and the investment banker and analysts of the brokerage firm underwriting the issue would like to safeguard reputation.
Insider trading data
Data on insider trading activity are obtained from CDA/InvestNet covering the period 1994 to 1998, so tests on this hypothesis use forecasts from this sub-period only.
CDA/InvestNet reports all insider trades that are required to be filed with the SEC, and we examine only open market purchases and sales and option exercises. 14 We eliminate trades by 13 The empirical results using the equity issuance dummy are robust to various definitions of sale of equity shares. The regression results are qualitatively similar using equity-sale cutoffs between 1% and 20% of MVE. 14 CDA/InvestNet lists 26 different transaction codes for insiders. We only include acquisitions and dispositions associated with open market purchases and sales, acquisitions from derivative exercises and other sales and purchases.
non-officer insiders, including block-holders, retirees, trustees, etc., in order to focus on the trading activities of those individuals that are most likely to have an impact on the reporting process of the firm. We examine insider trades in the 20 trading days immediately after the earnings announcement.
A firm is classified as a Seller in the year the insiders (CEO, chairman, vice presidents, and directors) are net sellers of the shares of the firm in the 20-day period after the earnings announcement, and is classified as a Purchaser in the year the insiders are net buyers of the firm's shares. The regression tests use the dummy variable, InsiderSale, which equals one for
Seller firm-years and 0 for Purchaser firm-years. Our sample consists of 1,434 Seller and 867
Purchaser firm-years. Table 5 compares the characteristics of the two groups of insider trades, Sellers and
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Purchasers. Sellers are, on average, higher growth firms and more likely to be issuing equity in the subsequent year or have issued equity in the current year. There are no significant differences in the size and profitability between the two groups.
Of greater interest to our study is the difference between the two groups in both the fo recast bias in the final month prior to the earnings announcement and the pattern of analyst forecast bias between long and short horizons. To directly test Hypothesis 2, we construct a pessimism variable, PESS last , which is equal to one if actual earnings beat or meet forecasts in the last month (month-1) prior to the earnings announcement and zero otherwise. The descriptive evidence on analyst pessimism is in Table 5 . Consistent with analyst guidance incentives associated with Insider Sales, we find that analysts are more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts for firms that have Net Insider Sales after the earnings announcements.
We also find that the Sellers are more likely to have a switch from optimism to pessimism during the year. Figure 4 demonstrates the general pattern. There is a shift from optimism to pessimism for firms where insiders are net sellers, whereas forecasts remain optimistic in firms where insiders are net purchasers. To document the statistical significance of this phenomenon we define the variable, SWITCH, to be equal to one if the first forecast (i.e.
month-12) is optimistic and the last forecast (i.e. month-1) is pessimistic; and zero if the first and last forecasts are both optimistic. A significantly greater number of net sellers (65.3%) experienced a switch from initial optimism to final pessimism. Table 6 reports the multivariate tests for the cross-sectional determinants of forecast pessimism. In the top panel, we run the following regression:
The variables are defined earlier. We include but do not report fixed year effects using year indicator variables in the above regression.
Consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2, we find that firms issuing equity in the following year are more likely to exhibit analyst pessimism at the end of the current year.
Furthermore, there is a significant positive relation between InsiderSale and PESS last , suggesting that firms beat or meet analysts forecasts have insiders who sell in the period immediately following the earnings announcement. These results are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 2. This result is robust to the inclusion of firm size, growth opportunities, and, most importantly, profitability. It is not surprising that more profitable firms tend to beat analysts' targets because this variable captures truly unexpected good performance.
In Panel B of Table 6 , we run the regression of the switch variable on the determinants.
As in Panel A, the estimated coefficients for Profit and InsiderSale variable are statistically significant. The results are consistent with insiders timing their sales to follow immediately after a good news earnings surprise, and consequently after an increase in stock price. This finding is consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3. In contrast, the new issue dummies are not statistically significant, indicating that the new issue incentive is not incrementally important to explain the switch in forecast pattern over the forecast horizon.
Overall, our results suggest that insiders g uide analyst earnings targets to facilitate trading on favorable terms after an earnings announcement. This ability to benefit from the insider transactions is derived from managers' ability to guide forecasts over the horizon of the forecasts prior to trading.
Conclusion
This paper examines the dynamic behavior of analyst earnings forecasts leading up to earnings announcements. We document time-period and forecast-horizon variation in analyst forecast pessimism. The most striking finding is that, d uring the 1990's, analysts issue systematically optimistic forecasts early in the fiscal year followed by systematically pessimistic forecasts as the earnings announcement approaches. This short-horizon pessimism in forecasts is consistent with our hypotheses based on managerial and firm incentives to sell shares in the post-announcement period. They are also consistent with recent media allegations and concerns expressed by policymakers that firms are able to guide analysts' forecasts.
We link the pattern of analyst pessimism in the 1990's with institutional and regulatory changes that create capital market incentives for managers to guide and beat forecasts in order to boost stock prices. These systematic changes include greater use of stock option compensation for managers, restrictions on trading by insiders to post-earnings announcement periods in response to the Insiders' Fraud and Securities Trading Act of 1988, and the lifting of the "shortswing rule" for insiders in 1991 allowing insiders to exercise stock options and immediately sell company stock.
Our cross-sectional predictions are motivated by the trading preferences of firms and managers after earnings announcements, which lead them to guide analysts to a systematic pattern of pessimistic forecasts prior to the earnings announcement. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that pre-announcement forecast pessimism is strongest in firms whose managers have the highest personal capital market incentives to avoid earnings disappointments. The statistics for the number of analysts are based on the number of unique analysts that provided at least one forecast for a given firm in year t. The number of firm-years is calculated by identifying the number of firms in the database in each year. A firm may have multiple analysts following and multiple forecasts for a given analyst, but is counted once in each year. In each sub-period, the number of firm-years is summed across the relevant years in the sub-period. The number of forecasts is the total number of analyst forecast observations recorded in each sub-period. This number is the product of the number of years, number of firms, number of analysts per firm, and number of forecasts by each analyst in each month in the year. MB is the ratio of market value of common equity to book value of common equity in year t -1. MVE is the market value of common equity ($million) at the end of year t-1. The pessimism index, %RelPess, is computed as the mean of a categorical variable, CatFE, which takes on the value 1 when an individual analyst forecast is pessimistic relative to the actual earnings outcome, 0 when an analyst forecast exactly equals actual earnings, and -1 when an individual analyst forecast is optimistic relative to the actual earnings outcome. Thus, %RelPess measures the relative proportion of pessimistic forecasts to optimistic forecasts at any point in time (for example, the relative proportion of pessimis tic forecasts made during the month prior to an earnings announcement). A positive %RelPess value imlies a higher fraction of pessimistic forecasts to optimistic forecasts and a negative value implies the opposite.
* For example, Month-12 corresponds to an earnings forecast made in the 12th month prior to the actual earnings announcement. 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, and 1995-98, respectively , and equal to 0 otherwise. Profit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the Actual Earnings(i,y)>0, and equal to 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book quintile ranking for firm i based on the market and book values of equity at the end of year t-1. MV is the annual market value of equity quintile ranking for firm i based on the market value of equity at the end of year t-1. MV and MB rankings are done for every year.
Month is a variable that indicates when an individual analyst earnings forecast was made. Month ∈ {-12,-11,..,-2,-1} is the number of months prior to the earnings announcement date (e.g. -12 is twelve months prior to earnings announcement date). 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, and 1995-98, respectively , and equal to 0 otherwise. Profit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the Actual Earnings(i,y)>0, and equal to 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book quintile ranking for firm i based on the market and book values of equity at the end of year t-1. MV is the annual market value of equity quintile ranking for firm i based on the market value of equity at the end of year t-1. MV and MB rankings are done for every year. Month is a variable that indicates when an individual analyst earnings forecast was made. Month ∈ {-12,-11,..,-2,-1} is the number of months prior to the earnings announcement date (e.g. -12 is twelve months prior to earnings announcement date). PESS last is an indicator variable equal to 1 if FE last is greater than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. FE last is the price-scaled median earnings forecast error for analysts covering firm i, for annual earnings in year y, in month after an annual earnings announcement. It is defined as the [Actual Earnings Per Share (i,y)-Forecast Earnings Per Share (i,y,t) ]/P*(i,y-1), where P*(i,y-1) is the first stock price when the first forecast is available on I/B/E/S for firm j in year y-1. SWITCH, is an indicator variable equal to one if the earliest forecast in the year was optimistic (i.e, FE month -12, year t < 0) and the final forecast in the year either was pessimistic (i.e, FE month -1, year t >= 0), and zero if the first and last forecast are both optimistic. A firm is classified as a seller (purchaser) if the insiders (CEO, Chairman, VP, directors) are net sellers (purchasers) of company shares in the 20 trading days after an earnings announcement. IssueNow is a dummy variable which equals if the firm's statement of cash flows indicates a positive sale of common and preferred stock (item #108) greater than 5% of the market value of equity in year t. IssueNext is a dummy variable which equals if the firm's statement of cash flows indicates a positive sale of common and preferred stock (item #108) greater than 5% of the market value of equity in year t+1. MB is the market-to-book quintile ranking for firm i based on the market and book values of equity at the end of year t-1. MV is the annual market value of equity quintile ranking for firm i based on the market value of equity at the end of year t-1. MV and MB rankings are done for every year. Regression of (1) analyst pessimism in the final month before an earnings announcement and (2) switch from optimism to pessimism, on the sale o f stock by the firm's CEO in the trading-window after the earnings announcement. The data set is a pooled time-series cross-sectional sample of 2,301 firm-year observations for the period 1994-98. 
